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Friday, May 24, 2019
Session Chair: Peder Andersen, University of Copenhagen;
10:00 – 10:18 | 3565784
Felipe Quezada1; John K. Stranlund1; Carlos A. Chavez2; James J. Murphy3; firstname.lastname@example.org
1University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, United States; 2Universidad de Talca, Talca, Maule, Chile; 3University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK, United States;
Recent experiments have examined the joint problem of groups coordinating harvests from a common pool resource (CPR) and deterring outsiders from poaching the resource. However, in these studies user groups are set exogenously. In this paper, we consider the problem of managing and defending CPR adding the feature that CPR groups form endogenously. Our experiments were conducted in the field with members of Chilean TURFs and in the lab with Chilean university students. When a group of insiders formed a coalition, they were granted the right to extract the resource. Outsiders, those who chose not to join a fishing coalition, could poach the insiders resource illegally. Insiders could invest in monitoring for poaching, and the cost of these investments was the primary treatment variable. If an outsider was caught poaching they faced an exogenous sanction.
Our theoretical model predicts that the grand coalition will be stable and unique when the cost of monitoring is low. However, when insiders are not able to monitor for poaching, or the cost is so high that monitoring is not worthwhile, the equilibrium coalition is the smallest profitable coalition. These predictions are supported by our experimental results for TURF members. When the cost of monitoring was low, TURF members formed coalitions on average that were close to the grand coalition. Coalition sizes were smaller when monitoring was not available or very costly, but they were larger than the minimum profitable coalition size. In general, the ability of TURF members to form fishing coalitions reduced exploitation of the resource in comparison to the open access outcome. Results for students were somewhat different. Coalition sizes were very close to the minimum profitable coalition size. However, student coalition formation led to reduced harvests when the insiders could monitor the outsiders.
Overall, our results suggest that coalitions to manage CPR are likely to form, even when poaching is a significant problem, and coalition formation is associated with lower exploitation of CPR. Finally, coalition sizes are sensitive to the cost of deterring poaching; large coalitions can form when poachers are easily deterred, but smaller coalitions form when deterrence is difficult.
10:18 – 10:36 | 3568039
Jennifer Beckensteiner1; David Kaplan2; Miriam Fernández3; Andrew Scheld1; email@example.com
1Virginia Institute of Marine Science, Virginia, USA; 2UMR MARBEC (U. Montpellier, CNRS, Ifremer, IRD), Sète, France; 3Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile;
Approximately 1,000 Territorial User Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are currently designated in Chile. This large TURF system offers opportunities to explore the impacts of spatial management on adjacent open-access areas and better understand interactions between the two. We analyzed catch of benthic resources in Chile to evaluate potential impacts of the large network of TURFs. Landings of keyhole limpet (Fissurella spp.), kelp (Lessonia spp.) and red sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) were used to estimate catch-per-unit effort (CPUEs) and catch-per-unit area (CPUAs) indices inside and outside TURFs. For these species, output from a linear mixed effects model reveal that CPUAs inside TURFs were significantly decreasing over time and with the number of TURFs implemented in a fishing cove. There were weak effect on CPUAs in open-access areas. However, CPUEs and CPUAs were significantly higher inside TURFs, suggesting that surrounding areas are less productive. This finding could be due to selective implementation of TURFs in the most productive fishing grounds or, conversely, the overexploitation of areas outside of TURFs. An elastic net regression was then used to explain catches in open-access areas, including a variety of variables related to the characteristics and activity of proximal TURFs. Contrasting results suggest that a) differences in catches are mostly driven by exogenous factors unrelated to management and b) when TURFs do have an impact, that impact appears to be negative and to grow over time. These results contribute to a better understanding of potential limitations and associated unintended costs of TURFs in Chile and provide future directions for policies bridging biodiversity conservation and fisheries management globally.
10:36 – 10:54 | 3581833
Raul Villanueva1; Juan Carlos Seijo1; Oswaldo Huchim-Lara1; firstname.lastname@example.org
1Universidad Marista de Merida, Merida/Yucatan, Mexico;
This work reports on how benefits distribute among owners of two different modalities of rights-based managed small-scale Panulirus argus lobster fisheries: individual and collective TURFs. In the individually-based TURF of Punta Allen members of the local fishing cooperative have exclusive accesses to individual fishing grounds targeting only for spiny lobsters. The collectively-based TURF scheme takes place in a multi-species lobster fishery of two nearby fishing communities of northeastern Yucatan. Each one of the fishing cooperatives of these communities has its own exclusive lobster fishing area (TURF). For the latter, by inter-communities self-agreement, TURF owners agreed to share their exclusive areas to fishers of the two involved small-scale fishing communities. Data from the fishing cooperative logbooks were used to calculate fishing revenues per fisher for the lobster fishing season 2017/2018. In the case of the spiny lobster multi-species fishery, fishing revenues of each fisher were assessed by the weighted average of catch composition value. In order to evaluate how the fishing benefits spread, Lorenz curve and Gini index (G) were calculated using the fishing revenues distribution among participating fishers.. Calculated G values had a range of [0.263,0.367], with the collectively-based TURF scheme fisheries having the lowest inequality levels of the reported fisheries of this study. These findings could indicate that fishing revenues in the two analyzed fisheries spread more equally than most fisheries where distributional performance has been assessed, presenting the most equity distribution the collective/collaborative TURF scheme. This could be evidence that cooperation may positively influence relative high distributional performance of fisheries managed under these schemes. A comparison with other worldwide fisheries for which their G have been reported is included.
10:54 – 11:12 | 3573047
Yaniv Stopnitzky1; Matthew Krupoff2; Jesse Anttila-Hughes3; email@example.com
1University of San Francisco, San Francisco, USA; 2Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA; 3University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA;
Intimate partner violence affects one in three women worldwide, with negative impacts on the physical, mental, and sexual well-being of women and their families. Despite its gendered burden, women commonly justify such violence in many contexts, supporting social norms that legitimate gender violence and impede efforts to reduce it. This paper uses data from Indonesia to show that womens stated views on the justifiability of spousal violence change subject to environmental conditions that strongly influence household economic outcomes, namely rainfall, which affects household income, and fishing conditions, which particularly affect mens income. Improved rainfall and fishing conditions both increased womens likelihood of saying that spousal violence is in some cases justifiable, an effect which if anything is stronger among employed women. Consistent with concerns over voice, we further show that improved rain and fishing conditions also increase the likelihood of women in the survey not providing answers to the questions on spousal violence. Our evidence is consistent with social norms that uphold and privilege men as primary breadwinners responsible for the potentially violent maintenance of household order.
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